Nearly All High-Security Atomic Material Pulled From Livermore Lab

The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California has transferred all but 3 percent of its closely guarded "special nuclear material" to other government sites, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration announced on Wednesday (see GSN, Nov. 11, 2010).
The deliveries were part of a U.S. effort launched nearly six years ago to consolidate the nation's high-security nuclear material. The project was previously slated to conclude in 2014, but a shortened NNSA schedule calls for completion no later than Oct. 1.
Special nuclear materials include plutonium and forms of enriched uranium (U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration release, June 27).
Meanwhile, the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico said on Wednesday it has merged two offices in a move expected to improve its capacity to fight the spread of nuclear substances and systems.
The step brings the NNSA research site's Nuclear Design and Risk Analysis Group together with its Safeguards and Security Systems Group to form the new Systems Design and Analysis Group. The reorganization would significantly benefit the institutional knowledge on "nuclear fuel cycle and safeguards" matters, according to a press release.
“Having this very crucial nuclear nonproliferation capability under a single organization is a huge advantage in terms of collaboration, and work and potential work sponsors will be channeled through a single point of contact,” LANL Associate Director Scott Gibbs said in provided comments. “Our customers will see a benefit as a result” (U.S. Los Alamos National Laboratory release, June 27).

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DHS Threat Analysis of Biodefense Lab Better, But Problems Remain: Report

The U.S. Homeland Security Department's latest analysis of the potential threat posed by a planned biodefense laboratory in Kansas is a "substantial improvement" from a 2010 assessment, but still does not sufficiently describe the potential dangers related to the site, according to an independent expert report issued on Friday (see GSN, June 6).
The National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility is to be built near the Kansas State University campus in Manhattan as a replacement for a decades-old animal disease research site on Plum Island in New York. The site would house Biosafety Level 4 research space, which is authorized to handle viruses and other agents for lethal diseases that have no cure.
The Obama administration has requested no funding for construction of the site in the next fiscal year, which begins on Oct. 1.
Among the diseases that would be researched at the facility are foot and mouth, along with infectious agents that can be passed from animals to humans.
The National Research Council in 2010 determined that the Homeland Security Department employed "flawed methods and shortcomings" in producing a threat analysis for the facility. Lawmakers in Washington then demanded that the department redo its assessment, which would again be studied by a group of independent specialists.
Homeland Security has resolved a significant number of the issues of concern noted on its 2010 threat analysis, according to the new report from the branch of the National Academies. "The new version uses more conventional risk assessment methods and conceptual models, presents clearer descriptions of the approaches, and complies better with standard practices than the previous version," the National Research Council said in a press release.
The department's 2010 threat analysis suggested there was close to a 70-percent likelihood that the escape of foot-and-mouth disease during the site's expected 50-year operational period could lead to people becoming infected. The new assessment determined "that for 142 possible release events, the cumulative probability of a release leading to an infection is 0.11 percent, or a 1 in 46,000 chance per year," the release says.
While some of the lowered danger could be linked to updated blueprints for the site, the new DHS analysis "underestimates the risk of an accidental pathogen release and inadequately characterizes the uncertainties in those risks," the National Research Council said.
"Moreover, the committee found that the updated probabilities of releases are based on overly optimistic and unsupported estimates of human-error rates; low estimates of infectious material available for release; and inappropriate treatment of dependencies, uncertainties, and sensitivities in calculating release probabilities," according to the release.
It adds: "The low estimates of risk found throughout the updated assessment are not in agreement with most modern, complex industrial systems, and in many instances the committee could not verify results because methods and data were unevenly or poorly presented. The updated assessment also contains inconsistent information, which made it difficult to determine the degree to which risks were underestimated."
The most recent blueprints for the facility seem "sound," the experts found. They said that problems with the threat analysis cannot be said to suggest troubles with the blueprint (National Research Council release, June 15).

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House Bid To Merge Homeland Security WMD Offices Draws Cautious Praise

By Douglas P. Guarino

Global Security Newswire

A scientist holds a slide prepared last year for biological hazards analysis under a U.S. effort to monitor areas throughout the country for the presence of harmful disease agents. Analysts have expressed tentative support for a plan to potentially merge two U.S. Homeland Security Department offices responsible for overseeing development of WMD detection technologies (AP Photo/Ben Margot).

WASHINGTON -- Plans for a possible merger between two Homeland Security Department offices responsible for monitoring potential threats from weapons of mass destruction is eliciting cautious praise from observers who hope such a move would help address concerns that some of the department's key detection technologies are not useful (see GSN, May 9).
In a little-noticed section of the legislative report that accompanies the fiscal 2013 homeland security spending bill, the House Appropriations Committee calls on DHS officials to develop a plan to consolidate the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and the Office of Health Affairs.
The first team is tasked with monitoring radiological and nuclear threats, with the second team focused on chemical and biological threats, among other responsibilities.
Under the House proposal, the department would have six months from the enactment of the legislation to develop the plan for a potential merger that would take place the following fiscal year.
Before changes are implemented, the Government Accountability Office would review the Homeland Security plan and assess “whether and how proposed changes would improve DHS coordination … on WMD defense issues,” the legislative report says.
Unlike at other government agencies, Homeland Security Department “WMD programs continue to be spread across many offices with duplicative and overlapping functions,” the report states. “There is confusion, for example, over which components are the ‘lead’ in certain incidents involving [chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear] agents and also over which are responsible for research and development to detect those agents.
“As a result, DHS programs have failed to satisfactorily fulfill congressional and presidential mandates to develop robust capabilities to detect WMD threats aimed against U.S. interest,” the committee contended.
A Homeland Security Department spokeswoman declined to comment on the legislation.
The House panel argued that inside the department, coordination between the various offices responsible for WMD issues is “ad hoc and intermittent, with limited cooperation between certain offices and limited awareness of what each is doing in the WMD defense mission space.” As a result, Homeland Security views on WMD issues “are presented in divergent and sometimes conflicting ways in interagency meetings, impairing the Department’s cooperation” with other government agencies, the report reads.
“In light of historic budget cuts designed to restore America’s fiscal health, DHS must make use of limited resources as efficiently as possible to protect the homeland,” the committee said. “Responsible consolidations that make sense programmatically could improve DHS WMD defense programs and save taxpayer dollars.”
In the lawmakers’ view, the existence of separate offices for Domestic Nuclear Detection and Health Affairs is “particularly noteworthy.” They said that the two organizations “are charged with developing the core of the Department’s WMD detection capabilities” and “have faced similar dilemmas in developing better” detection technology.
In addition to providing cost savings, merging these two offices “could provide greater awareness and coordination within DHS and [other government agencies] by creating a more visible focal point to counter-WMD coordination and strategic planning,” the report states.
While the House Appropriations Committee approved the legislation by a 28-21 vote on May 16, the full chamber has yet to take up the measure. Assuming the GOP-controlled House approves the bill, it would then have to be reconciled with the Senate version, which the upper chamber’s Democrat-controlled Appropriations committee approved by a 27-3 vote on May 22. The Senate version contains no similar provision.
A Senate Appropriations Committee staffer told Global Security Newswire that lawmakers in the upper chamber have yet to endorse the House proposal to merge the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and the Office of Health Affairs. However, the aide said the recommendation that DHS officials have six months to study the issue -- followed by a Government Accountability Office review -- is “grounded and disciplined.”
“Are we going to [mandate a merger] in the fiscal 2013 bill? No,” the aide said, but added that the House lawmakers were calling for a “legitimate inquiry” on the matter. This aide and others spoke on condition of anonymity, lacking permission to discuss the issue publicly.
DHS officials themselves have looked in recent years at the possibility of merging various offices within the department that deal with WMD issues, said the Senate staffer. The department analyzed the matter while preparing to publish the congressionally mandated Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report and Bottom-Up Review Report in 2010, but ultimately did not include any recommendations on the subject in either document, the staffer said.   
Some observers support the House proposal to study ways to consolidate WMD programs, but are skeptical of a potential merger between the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and Office of Health Affairs specifically.
Retired Air Force Col. Randall Larsen, chief executive officer of the non-profit WMD Center, told GSN that a better approach to consolidating DHS programs that deal with WMD issues would be to place the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office under the auspices of the DHS Science and Technology Office. Such a change might focus the nuclear detection office’s attention more heavily on the research and development of new nuclear detection technologies, rather than on efforts to deploy existing technology, he said.
Larsen contends that today’s DHS detection technology is inadequate. Rather than expend resources trying to use it, the department should instead focus on developing new technology, he said.
For example, a terrorist with an improvised nuclear device -- a crude weapon capable of catastrophic destruction -- could “shield it from our detectors with aluminum foil,” Larsen argues. “You don’t even need to use lead.”
To Larsen, it “doesn’t make a lot of sense” to merge the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office with the Office of Health Affairs. He noted that not all of the health office programs are related to WMD issues, such as its Workforce Health and Medical Support Division, which is focused largely on ensuring the occupational health of DHS employees.
Despite his reservations, Larsen said he is supportive of the House plan to study the issue, however.
Other experts say they support a potential merger between the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and the Office of Health Affairs, but are skeptical of a merger that would include the Science and Technology office.
Jeffrey Runge, who oversaw the Office of Health Affairs as DHS assistant secretary for health affairs and chief medical officer during the Bush administration, told GSN that it “makes a lot of sense” to combine the operational WMD programs under one unified team.
However, Runge said that including the Science and Technology Office in such a merger could have the negative impact of taking the department’s focus off the research and development of emerging technologies. He voiced concern about the possibility of deploying devices that may not yet be adequate.
“It’s a policy question -- should S&T be centralized or decentralized back into operational programs,” Runge said. “I favor the centralized approach.”
Runge pointed to BioWatch Generation 3 -- a DHS program aimed at developing devices that can detect biological threats in real time -- as an example of an initiative that has faced technical challenges.
One lesson he draws from that program is that the department should put more of an emphasis on developing better technologies rather than trying to use those that have not proven themselves to be effective. In some cases, initiatives like BioWatch Generation 3 that once were high priorities might have to be shelved, “as painful as it is,” said Runge.
The Senate Appropriations Committee placed restrictions on funds for BioWatch Generation 3 in its version of the Homeland Security fiscal 2013 spending bill, citing similar concerns.
While the bill provides the $39.9 million that the Office of Health Affairs requested for the program, a “provision is included in the bill withholding [$28.5 million] from obligation for Generation 3 until the [Homeland Security] secretary certifies to the committee that the science used to develop the technology is sound and warrants operational testing and evaluation,” the report accompanying the Senate legislation says.
An “October 2011 report by the Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism Research Center determined that the usefulness of BioWatch is unclear,” the Senate committee said. “[The] next major phase of development should be undertaken only if the secretary determines that the system can reliably perform.
“Therefore, requested funds are provided for performance testing and program management; however, funds for operational testing and evaluation shall not be obligated until the secretary certifies that it is prudent,” the report concludes.
Asked about the differing opinions regarding how to best consolidate the department’s WMD programs, a congressional aide familiar with the House plan said that while the focus is on a merger between the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and the Office of Health Affairs, the scope of the study is “not necessarily exclusive to just those two.”
In this vein, the House report calls on the department to “take a more holistic approach toward realignment by considering and describing any functions proposed to be transferred into the new Office from elsewhere in the Department to better align the WMD portfolio.” It also directs that “the secretary’s plan consider and detail the impacts of realigning certain functions outside of the new office,” including the Office of Health Affairs’ Workforce Health and Medical Support Division and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s research and development activities.
The congressional aide said that the report language calling for the merger study was the result of bipartisan discussions that involved both the House Appropriations Committee and the House Homeland Security Committee.

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Russia Orders WMD-Resistant Infant Carriers

The Russian Federal Security Service has called for production of over 100 special carriers intended to safeguard infant children of high-level government personnel in the event of a chemical, biological or nuclear strike, Russia Today reported on Thursday (see GSN, March 29).
The carriers are constructed from a unique dispersion substance and are designed to prevent occupants from being exposed to radiological materials, airborne pathogens and potentially harmful chemicals. The units could provide protection in heat levels ranging between -22 and 104 degrees Fahrenheit, provided that the surrounding atmosphere contains no less than 18 percent oxygen, according to the newspaper Izvestia.
The $60,000 carriers could remain effective for as long as a quarter of a day. They are built for children no more than 18 months old, but could also accommodate small animals (Russia Today, May 24).

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Higher-level traces of uranium found in Iran

By Joe Sterling

Inspectors found a high level of enriched uranium in Iran, a U.N. report said Friday, as world powers attempt to work to stop the country from developing the capacity for nuclear weapons.
The U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency asked Iran this month to explain the presence of particles of enrichment levels of up to 27%, found in an analysis of environmental samples taken in February at the Fordo fuel enrichment plant near the city of Qom.
The previous highest level had been 20%, typically used for hospital isotopes and research reactors, but is also seen as a shortcut toward the 90% enrichment required to build nuclear weapons.
Iran said in response that the production of such particles "above the target value" may happen for "technical reasons beyond the operator's control." The IAEA said it is "assessing Iran's explanation and has requested further details."

This development comes a day after Iran held nuclear talks in Baghdad with six nations: the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany. There had been no breakthrough in discussions.
Iran rejected calls to stop the high enrichment of uranium that can be used for weapons, while the international powers refused Tehran's demand for an immediate end to sanctions crippling its economy.
But the nations plan to meet next month in Moscow for another round of talks.
World powers suspect that Iran wants to build nuclear weapons, and they want to stop the nation from doing so. Iran says its atomic aspirations are for peaceful purposes.
The talks come at a crucial time for Iran. Its economy has been crippled by sanctions imposed by the United Nations, the United States and the European Union. Because 80% of Iran's foreign revenues are derived from oil exports, an embargo by the EU set to go into effect in July will put further pressure on its economy.
Iran threatened this year to close the Strait of Hormuz, a vital oil shipping lane, if sanctions were imposed on its exports of crude oil. Israel, which is believed to have its own nuclear arsenal and is alarmed over Tehran's hostility toward the Jewish state, has said it may attack Iran to try to stop the country from developing nuclear weapons.
European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton said "significant differences remain." But the resolve to continue talks may signal a change in tone, coming after past negotiations that have been marred by threats and allegations of foot-dragging and unreasonable demands.
The world powers made Iran an offer for stopping its processing of medium-enriched uranium, which can be used to make nuclear weapons, EU officials said.
The proposal also called for Tehran to prove that its nuclear program is being used for peaceful purposes as it claims and comply with U.N. Security Council resolutions, according to a Western official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the discussions.
Asked whether relief from the tough Western sanctions imposed on Iran will be on the table, the same Western official said, "There is no expectation it will happen as a result of this meeting. Iran would need to take significant concrete action first."
Iran's counter-proposal included five areas of nuclear and non-nuclear cooperation, Iran's state-run Islamic Republic News Agency reported late Wednesday.
A British Foreign Office spokesman said world powers are offering support for Iranian economic and agricultural development and the country's civilian nuclear program in exchange for cooperation.
Another idea on the table is an updated version of an offer to swap enriched uranium for nuclear fuel, EU officials said. There had been a proposal to swap most of Iran's low-enriched uranium for fuel rods to power a medical research reactor in Tehran.
Analysts say the change in mood at the negotiating table is positive, but there are mixed feelings about whether a breakthrough can be achieved.
Trita Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council, commended the participants for returning to talks. He said they "didn't give up just because they ran in a stumbling block."
"A feasible solution is to match tangible, verifiable Iranian concessions with a delay of the impending European Union oil embargo," Parsi said. "This would add time to the negotiation clock and buy both sides some breathing space."
Parsi said the Obama administration has mustered political will "to exhaust all options" before the only choice left is military. He notes that negotiations between adversaries in other instances have been painstakingly long, citing the U.S. and Vietnam talks and the negotiations to end conflict in Northern Ireland.
There will be stalemates and steps forward and backward, he said.
"What happened in Baghdad may have somewhat calculated in the sense that there was an awareness that there is enough time for an additional meeting (in Moscow) before European and American sanctions kick in on July 1," he said.
But David Albright, founder and president of the Institute for Science and International Security, a group devoted to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, said, "the clock is not very friendly at the moment" with a nervous Israel in the backdrop and a high-stakes political atmosphere with the Obama administration facing "aggressive Republicans" in an election year.
"Obama doesn't have years and years," he said. "He has weeks and weeks."
Albright said the Baghdad talks didn't "completely collapse," and the "success of this is that there's another meeting."
But "they need results," he said.
There didn't appear to be the minimal "progress on concrete results" that the United States wanted, such as creating a forum to begin discussing an agreement on enrichment levels. Albright said the sides need to start forging a series of small concessions and incentives before they go to larger steps.
Matthew Kroenig, a nuclear security expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, said he believes that "good will" can go only so far and that "room for compromise" will continue to be difficult. He believes that making a "military threat more credible" could help pressure Iran.
He said both sides have an incentive to keep talks going and to keep the impression that the discussions are "fruitful." He said the White House is afraid that if negotiations break down, Israel "will take matters into its own hands," and the United States could be dragged into unwanted war. Iran wants to engage in what are perceived to be a "fruitful" talks to buy time and avoid Israeli action.
"I'm afraid it's really hard for me to see a diplomatic solution to this," Kroenig said.
Dina Esfandiary, an analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, called the "willingness to continue talks" and understand each other's stance "noteworthy."
"Prior Western concessions on location and time were intended to show their good will, something that has been repeated in choosing Moscow (more sympathetic to Iran's stance) for next month's talks," she said.
She said the talks helped the sides understand which "concessions were wanted and which were unlikely to be granted."
"Whether the talks accomplished anything depends on the goals: If the idea was to walk out with an agreement solving the Iranian nuclear crisis, then no, they haven't accomplished that. But everyone agrees that that was highly unlikely. If the idea was to continue and strengthen confidence-building and the negotiations that began a month ago in Istanbul, then Baghdad was a success," she said.
At present, she said, expectations on each side don't match because "Iran wants recognition of its right to enrich" which other nations have only "hinted at accepting only if Iran proves the peaceful nature of its program first, and this has yet to be resolved."
"Iran is as suspicious of Western intentions as the West is of Iranian tensions. Neither side feels as though compromising more than they have already offered to will serve their interests. The real breakthrough will come when each side feels they have more to gain by compromise than by standing their ground," she said.
She said the success of the Moscow talks will depend world powers' willingness to accept some form of Iranian enrichment.
"This is something Iran has been categorical about. But Iran will also have to take steps to prove the peacefulness of its program and restore what (U.S. Secretary of State) Hillary Clinton has described as 'the confidence of the international community,' to the extent where the international community would feel comfortable allowing them to enrich."
One scenario she cited is a "freeze-for-freeze" system.
"Iranians must be willing to discuss relinquishing progress on their nuclear program if they want the West to consider delaying and possibly lifting sanctions. But it is hard to tell what Iran will do. Of course, an ideal outcome would be for both sides to come prepared to make concessions in order to come to a lasting agreement that addresses the problem, but this is unlikely to happen. Even if Iran's negotiating team agrees to certain terms, they will have to have it approved back home."
Esfandiary doubts Iran would agree to suspend 20% enrichment "even for a short period of time and won't agree to forgo it completely."
But she said that "exploiting the slightest chance of a temporary halt and framing the negotiations in terms of a step-by-step approach, beginning with a series of confidence-building measures from both sides, will enable the P5+1 to judge Iran's willingness to conduct serious negotiations. As with everyone else, I am hopeful but doubtful that Iran would accept such conditions."
The United States, France, Russia, China, Britain and Germany are called the P5+1, a reference to Germany plus the other nations, permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. Another name for the group is the E3+3, a reference to the European countries of Germany, France and Britain, and the others.
The French foreign ministry on Friday echoed the concerns and resolve of the world powers, saying they presented a "package of concrete measures to build confidence that the Iranian nuclear program is exclusively for civilian purposes.
"Iran must then be in a position to respond constructively to our proposals so that a genuine negotiation process leading to concrete results can be initiated. Failing this, we shall be prompted to take new measures, in line with the two-pronged approach combining openness to dialogue and sanctions."

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World Eliminates 74 Percent of Known Chemical Arms

Member states to an international disarmament accord by the end of April had eliminated 73.6 percent of their disclosed chemical warfare stocks, the head of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons said on Tuesday (see GSN, May 21).
As of April 29 -- the 15th anniversary of the Chemical Weapons Convention's entry into force and the final date permitted for full disposal of member states' chemical arsenals -- "about 51,128 [metric tons], or 73.64 percent, of Category 1 chemical weapons had been destroyed under verification by the [OPCW] Secretariat," Director General Ahmet Üzümcü said in prepared remarks to the 15th Chemical Weapons Demilitarization Conference in the United Kingdom (see GSN, April 30). Category 1 weapons contain materials such as nerve or blister agents that have little if any nonmilitary purpose.
Albania, India and an additional CWC signatory nation have fully eliminated their chemical-weapon stockpiles, Üzümcü noted (see GSN, Oct. 17, 2008). The third nation, while never officially confirmed, is widely known to be South Korea.
Libya, Russia and the United States are continuing work to finish off their chemical stocks.
The United States as of the April cutoff date had eliminated 24,923.7 metric tons -- or 89.8 percent -- of its declared chemical warfare assets, he said, noting the country expects to dispose of the remaining material by September 2023.
Russia by April 29 had eliminated 24,961 metric tons of chemical warfare materials, or 62.5 percent of its arsenal. Full elimination of the initial 40,000-metric-ton stockpile is scheduled to be complete by December 2015 (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons release I, May 22).
The chemical disarmament gathering in Glasgow was the 15th and last of its kind, according to an OPCW press release. It included in excess of 170 participants from 16 nations (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons release II, May 22).

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Australia Rejects Uranium Sale to Pakistan

A departing Australian envoy to Pakistan on Thursday said his government would not consider selling uranium to the South Asian state, though it is pursuing plans to make the material available to neighboring India, Dawn reported (see GSN, Jan. 20, 2011).
“India has an exemption from Nuclear Suppliers Group, which does not apply to Pakistan,” Australian High Commissioner to Pakistan Timothy George said in goodbye remarks. The organization of nuclear exporting nations in 2008 granted a special exception enabling members to engage in civilian atomic trade with India, even though the nuclear-armed state has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (see GSN, Jan. 26).
Uranium can be employed to power nuclear energy reactors or, with sufficient enrichment, used in nuclear weapons.
Islamabad, which also holds nuclear weapons outside the nonproliferation accord, has on multiple occasions said it should have the same rights to acquire Australian uranium as its South Asian rival. George, though, said the two nations' situations are not identical (Dawn, May 18).

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U.S. Congress Research Arm: Nuclear Agency Can Demand Proliferation Assessments

By Elaine M. Grossman

 

- The U.S. Congressional Research Service has found that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission can require domestic facility license applicants to evaluate any potential proliferation dangers related to their proposed work, despite NRC resistance to such an approach (see GSN, April 5).
“It would appear that the commission could reasonably conclude that it has sufficient existing authority to promulgate a regulation requiring that applicants provide the commission with a proliferation risk assessment as part of the license application process,” according to a March 27 CRS memo obtained by Global Security Newswire.
The four-page advisory, requested by Representative Jeff Fortenberry (R-Neb.), was written by a CRS legislative attorney and cites an array of provisions in U.S. law as the basis for its argument.  Through a spokeswoman, the lawmaker on Tuesday provided a statement saying he was “in the process of reviewing the information,” but understood the mandate for a proliferation appraisal “falls within the jurisdiction of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.”
An NRC staff report on a related matter is expected in October.  The nuclear agency is expected to offer its five commissioners a formal response to an American Physical Society petition, which in June 2010 argued that the nuclear agency should adopt a new rule that would make a proliferation risk assessment a standard part of the licensing process.
A resolution of the issue by majority vote of the agency’s commissioners could follow the staff recommendation, but that timing is uncertain.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission issues licenses for U.S. commercial nuclear activities and facilities, such as atomic reactors and uranium enrichment plants.
Fortenberry’s request to the Congressional Research Service focused on license applications for uranium enrichment, a process that can be used for processing sensitive materials for either nuclear power plants or atomic weapons.  However, several issue experts said a more pertinent issue would be NRC consideration of potential proliferation associated with any new nuclear energy technologies.
To date, commission staff has found that proliferation assessments would be “beyond the scope” of NRC responsibilities, according to an environmental impact statement completed in February for one high-profile license application.  The February document also indicates the agency perspective is that a stand-alone analysis of proliferation risks is unneeded.
“Given the NRC’s comprehensive regulatory framework, ongoing oversight, and active interagency cooperation, it is the NRC’s current view that a formal nuclear nonproliferation assessment is not necessary to ensure the protection of the common defense and security,” the document states.
The existing NRC license application review process includes an evaluation of a company’s ability to safeguard materials and information inside its facility.  Agency officials have said the "net effect" of this licensing approach is to discourage the spread of sensitive technologies, according to the 113-year-old physicists’ organization.
Some issue experts, however, insist that the nuclear agency’s standard approach is not enough to stem global proliferation.
The APS rule-change request was made amid growing concern about a proposed GE-Hitachi nuclear facility in Wilmington, N.C., that would for the first time use a laser-based process to enrich uranium for commercial reactors.
If commercially successful, the laser enrichment approach might significantly cut reactor fuel costs.  Other nations would be likely to redouble their efforts to develop similar techniques to remain competitive in the marketplace, according to nuclear energy experts.
An ability offered by lasers to produce uranium in smaller facilities and consume less power -- compared to today’s centrifuge approach -- could also make the new enrichment technique attractive to proliferator nations interested in hiding clandestine efforts at developing a nuclear weapon, many issue specialists assert (see GSN, July 30, 2010).
It is possible that an illicit laser enrichment site could be built with a small "footprint," making it virtually undetectable from the outside, observers say.
The congressional research arm did not address whether the Nuclear Regulatory Commission should mandate proliferation risk assessments for laser enrichment or other new nuclear technologies.  Rather, it looked only at whether there exists in U.S. law sufficient NRC authority to require such evaluations by uranium enrichment license applicants.
One federal public health and welfare statute cited by the congressional memo gives the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the power to “prescribe such regulations or orders as may be necessary or desirable to promote the nation’s common defense and security with regard to control, ownership, or possession of any equipment or device … capable of separating the isotopes of uranium or enriching uranium in the isotope 235.”
Uranium 235 can be used as a key ingredient in a nuclear weapon, as it is capable of sustaining a fission chain reaction.
The Congressional Research Service noted that even though license applications are geared mostly toward ensuring health and safety, the NRC role of advancing “common defense and security” through its rules and regulations offers a basis for demanding a proliferation risk assessment.
“A requirement that an applicant submit an assessment that details the technological and material proliferation risks associated with a facility, in addition to the steps the applicant has taken, and will take, to combat unauthorized disclosure of technological and material information, could be characterized by the commission as a measure designed to promote ‘the common defense and security,’” the CRS memo states.
David McIntyre, an NRC spokesman, said this week he was unaware of the Congressional Research Service advisory and could not comment on it.
However, other NRC staffers have previously spoken to the issue.
“The NRC considers a nuclear nonproliferation impact assessment to be outside the scope of the agency’s statutory responsibilities,” Michael Weber, then the director of the NRC Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Office, said in a March 2010 letter to nonproliferation advocate Tom Clements.  Neither the Atomic Energy Act nor the National Environmental Policy Act calls for “such an assessment in the context of domestic licensing,” he said.
The CRS legal analysis also notes an NRC obligation under U.S. law to avoid issuing a license that “would be inimical to the common defense and security or would constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public,” according to Title 42 of the U.S. Code.
“Given this mandate, the commission could reasonably consider a new proliferation risk assessment requirement to be within its general authority to issue such regulations” as necessary to carry out its responsibilities under the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, the congressional analysis states.
That law requires licensing for civilian uses of nuclear materials and facilities, and empowers the nuclear commission to create and enforce standards to govern these uses in protecting public health and safety.
If the commission itself similarly concludes that it has the authority to require proliferation evaluations, such a rule change for license applicants “would likely have to be implemented through [federal] notice and comment rulemaking procedures,” the CRS memo notes.
Some issue experts this week hailed the CRS finding.
“As a simple matter of good governance, the NRC should support a proliferation risk assessment when there are legitimate uncertainties,” said R. Scott Kemp, an associate research scholar at Princeton University.  “Even [if] the responsibility is not within the legal mandate, they should do what they can to facilitate such an assessment.”
Others are questioning whether the nuclear agency is the appropriate U.S. agency to oversee this type of proliferation review.
“I am not convinced the NRC is the best organization to do this,” said James Acton, a senior associate at the Nuclear Policy Program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  “Personally I think [an] interagency task force led by State would be better.”
There are few indications, though, that another agency such as the State Department -- which typically takes a leading role in U.S. nonproliferation efforts around the globe -- would spearhead such risk assessments.  Thus, it is “far better that the NRC conducts the study than no one does it,” Acton opined.
As it stands, the APS petition requests that responsibility for conducting a proliferation risk assessment be assigned to a facility license applicant, a detail that troubles some issue experts.
“Apart from the obvious conflicts of interest, a proper nonproliferation assessment is a sufficiently esoteric and nuanced thing that I do not believe that any industrial corporation can, by itself, perform an assessment of its own technology,” said Kemp, a former State Department science adviser for nonproliferation and arms control.  “Nor do I believe that it is sufficient merely to hire one or two outside experts who work under the purview of the corporation.”
“Any nonproliferation impact assessment must not be conducted by the company -- or its appointees -- partly because of the risk of a pro forma submission but mostly because the issues at stake are political and industry assessments tend to be too narrowly technically focused,” Acton agreed.
Frank von Hippel, a professor of public and international policy at Princeton, said one way of ensuring a clear-eyed and balanced treatment in a license applicant’s proliferation evaluation would be to subject the document to expert review.
For its part, the physicists’ organization recommended in its petition that NRC staff enlist the aid of other federal entities -- such as the Energy Department’s semiautonomous National Nuclear Security Administration -- in reviewing an industry-submitted proliferation analysis.
A useful historical model could be a decision by the George W. Bush administration to circulate a draft 2008 Energy Department proliferation assessment of its Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, von Hippel said.  The partnership initiative was aimed at expanding peaceful power generation while limiting sensitive enrichment and reprocessing activities, but experts said it was found to run some unintended proliferation risks.
Acton also cited the draft GNEP proliferation assessment as “a substantial document and an example of the level of detail that should be required.”
He noted that one version of a future proliferation risk appraisal could remain classified to protect sensitive details, while an unclassified copy could be made available for public comment.
“The process should be as open as possible,” said von Hippel, who co-chairs the International Panel on Fissile Materials.

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Pentagon-Funded Research Could Bolster Bioweapon Scanner Tech

Findings published earlier this week could lay the groundwork for advancements in portable biological-weapon scanner technology, the Journal of Visualized Experiments announced (see GSN, May 16).
The U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency financed the studies; they include an examination of steps for setting apart organic molecules without reliance on analytical facilities or electric power.
"This is a hand-held electricity-free device which can be used in the field by the war-fighter, in conjunction with their detection platforms," said David Pawlowski, a scientist with the State University of New York (Buffalo).
The procedure would "be useful for detection of typical biological warfare agents," said Pawlowski, who oversaw the project with fellow researcher Richard Karalus (Journal of Visualized Experiments, May 14).

 http://www.nti.org/gsn/

Exposed to Anthrax? In the Future, Your Shirt Could Provide Early Warning

By Dawn Lim

WASHINGTON -- The Pentagon wants clothing and industrial paint to be built with covert chemical warfare detectors, so that it can better anticipate threats such as anthrax, a defense solicitation reveals (see GSN, Nov. 1, 2011).

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the unit charged with reducing threats from biological warfare and nuclear weapons, is expressing “significant interest in materials that physically transform upon exposure to (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) agents, isotopes, and their precursors,” government documents show.
Officials envision detection technologies that generate certain signatures when exposed to anthrax spores, nuclear materials, medical isotopes, and chemical weapons. They want these reactions to occur covertly -- visually undetectable but apparent under infrared or black light, according to the call for small business proposals.
The technology could be used by the nuclear industry to protect employees from radioactive leaks. For instance, “a worker’s clothing could be treated with a material that transforms upon exposure,” reads the solicitation. Law enforcement could add the detection materials to industrial paint or construction materials.
The Pentagon has been eyeing ways to detect chemical warfare for years. It issued a call in 2010 for ways to map out chemical vapors across cities, with the goal of creating algorithms to help detect chemical weapons agents.
It’s tricky coming up with detection methods that don’t yield a lot of false positives. Scientists have encountered problems trying to create tests where substances in the environment don’t drown out the chemical signal from a biological weapon sample.
Scientists that have been experimenting with techniques include researchers at the Queen’s University in Belfast, who have been working on ways to shine laser beams onto a sample, with the aim of analyzing the light scattered to determine a chemical compound. The Australian Defense Department also has been testing hand-held devices that detect chemical and biological agents.

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Approval Process Could Sink WMD Defense Bill

A bill intended to carry out expert advice on countering biological terrorism and other WMD threats is "almost assured of failure" in Congress as a result of self-interested legislators, former Senator Bob Graham (D-Fla.) told the Huffington Post last week (see GSN, May 10).
The House Homeland Security Committee backed the "WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2011" on Wednesday, but lawmakers' unwillingness to simplify their oversight of Homeland Security Department operations means the bill must also receive endorsement from the Energy and Commerce, Foreign Affairs, Transportation and Infrastructure, and intelligence committees. The Senate would then have its say.
The bill offers measures corresponding to recommendations from the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, which referred to potential biological strikes as the most significant danger to the United States.
"As somebody once said, there is nothing as permanent as a subcommittee of a Senate committee," said Graham, who co-chaired the commission with former Senator Jim Talent (R-Mo.). "People build their careers around these committees of targeted influence."
"Congress has organized itself in a way to make it impossible for anything related to terrorism to be enacted," Graham told the Post shortly following the WMD bill's approval by the Homeland Security Committee.
Measures within the legislation include authorizing appointment of a special assistant to the president for biodefense; requiring a U.S. policy for countering biological threats and a funding plan incorporating an evaluation of preparatory shortcomings and funding problems; and mandating the development of a "national biosurveillance strategy" within the Homeland Security Department.
A second expert said "efforts now are being made to solve most key problems via interagency committees."
"From personal experience during the post 9/11 period, I can attest to the fact that this seldom works well -- if it works at all," said Donald Henderson, who led the international effort to eradicate smallpox. "It is like having an orchestra with no conductor, albeit with individual leads for each instrumental section."
Bush-era Homeland Security Council biodefense policy chief Robert Kadlec added: "We are not well served by decentralization."
"No one’s in charge" and officials "don't always work collegially" in carrying out joint duties, Kadlec said.
Graham warned the stakes are high.
"The greatest WMD threat facing the United States is not nuclear or chemical or radiological. It’s biological," he said. "As our most significant threat, it deserves to have a permanent, accountable, sufficient visibility so that this issue can be kept before the public."
"The current system is vulnerable," Graham warned.
The bill's primary congressional backer warned: "This is a darn big issue."
"There's probably no bigger issue in homeland security" than readying to avert, react to, defend from and recuperate after a WMD strike, Representative Bill Pascrell (D-N.J.) added. The previous Congress failed to pass the bill and a repeat outcome is possible, even though the proposal has significant backing from GOP and Democratic lawmakers, according to the Post (Andrea Stone, Huffington Post, May 11).

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Tool Could Aid in Prioritizing Vaccine Preparation

A computer program unveiled on Thursday by the U.S. National Academies' Institute of Medicine includes a formula that could be used by official planners and others in choosing possible future vaccines to pursue through unilateral and multilateral initiatives, the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy reported (see GSN, Oct. 26, 2011).
The institute created the system -- dubbed "Strategic Multi-Attribute Ranking Tool for Vaccines" -- upon instruction from the Health and Human Services Department's National Vaccine Program Office, which established the mechanism's preparation as the initial action in the 2010 National Vaccine Plan.
The program requires significant details on affected demographics. The formula can take into account as many as 29 characteristics linked to entrepreneurial, financial, institutional, medical, political and social frames of reference; data types can include physical maturity, gender status, vaccine administration, medical infrastructure utilization and expenses.
The institute stressed that the system is intended as an aid and not a replacement to human decision-making. The program's preliminary iteration has yet to be released, but officials are seeking input from insiders and plan to issue the planning tool on terms permitting its dissemination and modification.

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WMD Defense Bill Gets House Panel Endorsement

The U.S. House Homeland Security Committee on Wednesday endorsed without opposition a bill designed to bolster federal efforts to counter biological terrorism and other WMD threats (see GSN, June 24, 2011).
The "WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2011" would authorize appointment of a special assistant to the president for biodefense; require a U.S. policy for countering biological threats and a funding plan incorporating an evaluation of preparatory shortcomings and funding problems; mandate the development of a "national biosurveillance strategy" within the Homeland Security Department; make WMD vaccines and reaction advice available  to emergency response personnel; and permit interception under the Securing the Cities initiative of a weapon incorporating radioactive material.
“This legislation implements many of the recommendations of the [Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism], which in 2008 delivered the dire warning that terrorists are likely to deploy a weapon of mass destruction somewhere in the world by the end of 2013," committee Chairman Peter King (R-N.Y.) said in a statement.
"Today’s committee passage of this vital legislation is an important step in further securing our homeland against such an attack here. I am pleased to have joined Representative Bill Pascrell (D-N.J.), who has been an effective proponent in moving WMD legislation through Congress”.

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Experts: Nuclear Dialogue Gets New Backing From Iranian Leader

Iran's supreme religious leader has acted in an exceptionally high-profile manner on recent atomic discussions with six major governments, suggesting Iranian diplomats would enjoy his unambiguous backing in potentially seeking to defuse a long-running standoff over suspected nuclear weapons activities, the Christian Science Monitor on Friday quoted experts on the Middle Eastern nation as saying (see GSN, May 3).
Diplomats from Tehran are scheduled on May 23 to meet in Baghdad with representatives of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States in an effort to resolve international concerns that Tehran's atomic activities are geared toward establishment of an Iranian nuclear-weapon capability. Iran has maintained its nuclear efforts are aimed strictly toward civilian ends.  The gathering would follow up on an April session in Istanbul, Turkey.
Support from Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who wields the final word on all Iranian policy decisions, would shield a possible atomic deal against domestic legislative disputes like the challenges faced by an agreement hashed out in 2009, the Monitor reported (see GSN, Jan. 20, 2010). Many observers believe Khamenei would back a negotiated resolution if the intensifying economic pressure against Iran endangered the existence of its present government, according to the newspaper.
At the same time, Khamenei's highly publicized link to the dialogue indicates his country's delegates could behave less flexibly in hammering out an agreement, specialists in Iran said. The elimination of economic penalties against Iran is the country's "minimum expectation" of the multilateral process, Gholam-Ali Hadad-Adel, a high-level counselor to the supreme leader, said on Wednesday.
“The leader's (open) involvement in the whole process is a major shift because until now, he had never done it," according to one unidentified expert in Tehran. "This means Iran's negotiators will have a lot more leeway in the compromises they make, and that whatever they commit to will stick."
"So Iran will negotiate,” the observer said. “But he's taking the lead in foreign policy because he thinks (President Mahmoud) Ahmadinejad was too compromising in the past.”
U.S. specialists anticipate Tehran will demand concessions unacceptable to the six other negotiating nations.
“There are indications Iran could be preparing its elite and the population for some sort of deal. But the Iranian side will also be looking for some of the sanctions to be rolled back, and that could be more difficult,” RAND expert Alireza Nader said. “There are a lot of steps to be taken, and the process could really face hurdles along each of those steps. Looking at the Baghdad negotiations, I don't think you should expect a 'final solution'" (Roshanak Taghavi, Christian Science Monitor, May 4).
Tehran on Friday reaffirmed its refusal to halt operations at the subterranean Qum uranium enrichment facility, Reuters reported. The uranium enrichment process has the potential to generate civilian nuclear fuel as well as bomb material.
The five permanent U.N. Security Council member nations and Germany intended in negotiations to seek an end to activities at the site as well as Iranian production of 20 percent enriched uranium, a high-level U.S. government insider said last month (see GSN, April 9). The leader of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization quickly ruled out compliance with the first demand (see GSN, April 10).
The nation's envoy to the International Atomic Energy Agency on Friday said he saw "no justification" for shuttering the facility, which he noted is subject to U.N. monitoring.

"When you have a safe place, secure place under IAEA control, then why do you tell me that I should close it?" Ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh asked, stressing his nation had constructed the facility to improve protection of its atomic assets against possible military action by Israel or the United States.
"[Qum] is a safe place. We have spent a lot of money and time to have a safe place," he said.
Iranian uranium enrichment would "never be suspended," according to the official. "Neither sanctions, nor military actions, nor terror against our scientists will stop the enrichment."
Soltanieh refused to discuss requests by Western powers for an end to the country's manufacturing of 20 percent enriched uranium. Tehran says it needs the material for operating a medical isotope production reactor, while the United States and other nations worry the operation is a key step toward production of weapon-grade material, which requires an enrichment level of roughly 90 percent (Fredrik Dahl, Reuters I, May 4).
Beijing should back multilateral steps to address Iran, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said on Friday, adding that preventing the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran is an objective China holds in common with her country.
Washington hopes to resolve the manner without military force, Clinton added during a stop in the Chinese capital.
"The best way to achieve the diplomatic solution we all seek is to stay strong and united,” Agence France-Presse quoted Clinton as stating in comments written for delivery to high-level Chinese government personnel. “If we ease off the pressure or waver in our resolve, Iran will have less incentive to negotiate in good faith or to take the necessary steps to address the international community’s concerns about its nuclear program.”
China and India as of June 28 could fall subject to unilateral U.S. penalties targeting state importers of petroleum from Iran. Each nation has curbed purchases of unrefined Iranian oil while publicly taking issue with the U.S. measures.
Clinton is scheduled to start a trip to India at the beginning of next week, and the petroleum matter is an anticipated priority during her stay, AFP reported (Agence France-Presse I/Dawn, May 4).
Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak on Friday said Iran's atomic policy might in the future enable the state to construct a nuclear weapon in 60 days, Reuters.
"They are currently trying to achieve immunity for the nuclear program," Barak said in an interview with the Israel Hayom newspaper. "If they arrive at military nuclear capability, at a weapon, or a demonstrated capability, or a threshold status in which they could manufacture a bomb within 60 days -- they will achieve a different kind of immunity, regime immunity."
The minister countered former Israeli General Security Service head Yuval Diskin's suggestion last week that Tel Aviv was promoting a "false impression" of an Israeli capability to fully end Iranian nuclear activities.
"This is not so. We have been talking all the time about a delay," Barak said, suggesting Israeli leaders could consider merely setting back Iran's atomic progress to be a worthwhile endeavor.
Iran might view Israel's possible elimination through nuclear force to justify the possibility of a devastating backlash, the official added. Israel is widely thought to presently be the Middle East's sole nuclear-armed state, but the nation has publicly neither confirmed nor denied possessing such weapons.
"After the exchange of strikes, Islam would remain and Israel would no longer be what it was," he said (Dan Williams, Reuters II, May 4).
Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and one-time top intelligence officials are harming Tel Aviv's bid to rein in Iranian atomic activities, the Xinhua News Agency quoted him as telling the Israeli newspaper (see GSN, May 1).
"The Olmert gang is traveling the world and saying things that weaken Israel's significant accomplishment of turning the Iranian issue into an important and urgent one -- not only to Israel but to the world," Barak said. "It isn't hard to see that this is only serving Iran."
Iran "is not even [Diskin's] field of expertise or his responsibility, and the government is the one that has to make decisions," he added (Xinhua News Agency I, May 3).
Israeli President Shimon Peres, though, warned on Thursday of possible negative repercussions from taking advance military action against Iran's nuclear efforts.
“You must ask, what will be the next step?” Peres told the Globe and Mail. “In order to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear(-armed) country you have to introduce a system of verification and inspection,” he said, suggesting an armed offensive could endanger development of the arrangement.
“Say if somebody wants to attack Iran -- that’s good, but what will happen after the attack?” he asked. “Some people say it will make Iran powerless for two to three years. That’s not good enough" (Patrick Martin, Globe and Mail, May 3).
Delegates for the six powers negotiating with Iran are "not naive," but are still hopeful about the potential for achieving progress in the atomic discussions, Haaretz quoted high-level personnel for the United Kingdom as saying in talks with Israeli national security adviser Yaakov Amidror. The Israeli official since Sunday has been in the British capital to address matters related to Iran; he spoke with his British equivalent, Kim Darroch, Foreign Secretary William Hague and high-level intelligence and defense insiders.
"There were very intense discussions on Iran," British Ambassador to Israel Matthew Gould told Haaretz following his participation in the exchange. "We compared notes about the negotiations approach, about how we continue to tighten sanctions and about the analysis of the progress of the Iranian nuclear program. The level of cooperation between the two countries is very high."
"We are very clear, we are absolutely not naive about Iran's intentions and about Iran's negotiation tactics," the newspaper on Friday quoted Gould as saying. "The people in London who deal with this dossier have been dealing with Iran for years and years."
The world powers "will not let Iran use those negotiations simply to buy time," the British envoy added. "These will not be open-ended negotiations and if Iran thinks it can just string those negotiations out to avert further pressure they are totally wrong."

"Iran will not get something for nothing. We will not be lifting sanctions simply because the atmosphere of the talks is constructive. Iran needs to come to the table with concrete proposals for how it can rebuild the trust of the international community. We will judge Iran by its actions and take our decisions accordingly. People who are worried that we are going to get carried away with a kind of negotiating warmth and that suddenly we will dismantle the sanctions regime don't need to worry," Gould said.
Only substantive Iranian actions could prompt cancellation of a European Union ban on Iranian petroleum set to take effect on July 1, the official added. "Iran must not think and Israel must not worry that just because we are talking the pressure is off Iran," he said.
"We all agree that a negotiated peaceful solution to this is better than the alternative," Gould said. "If this is the case, we need to at least keep the door open to the possibility that these talks might succeed. We need to be ready to take yes for an answer. I know there is concern in some quarters in Israel that the P-5+1 will give away all the leverage we have with the sanctions just to get an agreement. I think our record on this issue should give confidence that we are not trying to get an agreement just for the sake of an agreement" (Barak Ravid, Haaretz, May 4).
Germany's top diplomat on Friday said Iran's present atomic work "represents an enormous danger" to Israel and the surrounding area, AFP reported.

"We cannot and will not accept an Iranian nuclear weapon," German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle added in remarks to a Jewish lobbying organization in Washington. "We need substantive and verifiable guarantees that Iran is not pursuing a nuclear weapon."
"Our patience is limited. We will not accept playing for time," Westerwelle said, adding "the Iranian regime continues to threaten Israel with annihilation."

"I want you to know that we will continue to stand by Israel's side," he said (Agence France-Presse II/Google News, May 4).
Tel Aviv should avoid launching strikes against Iranian atomic holdings, the Yomiuri Shimbun quoted Japanese Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba as telling his Israeli counterpart on Tuesday.
"Military operations would give Iran an excuse for going ahead with nuclear development and increase instability in the region, so patience and self-restraint are called for on the part of Israel," Gemba told Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman (Hiroyuki Ishida, Yomiuri Shimbun, May 3).
Iran's Bushehr atomic energy facility is performing at nine-tenths of its potential and would reach peak output on May 23, Xinhua quoted the site's Russian state-run construction firm as saying on Thursday.

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Smart gas sensors offer better chemical detection

Smart chemical sensors can detect chemical weapon vapors or indicators of disease better than the current generation of detectors; they also consume less power, crucial for stretching battery life on the battlefield, down a mineshaft, or in isolated clinics

Assembling the table-top test bed for smart gas detector // Source: umich.edu

Portable gas sensors can allow you to search for explosives, diagnose medical conditions through a patient’s breath, and decide whether it is safe to stay in a mine.
These devices do all this by identifying and measuring airborne chemicals, and a new, more sensitive, smart model is under development at the University of Michigan. The smart sensor could detect chemical weapon vapors or indicators of disease better than the current design. It also consumes less power, crucial for stretching battery life down a mineshaft or in isolated clinics.
In the gold standard method of gas detection, chemicals are separated before they are measured, said Xudong “Sherman” Fan, a professor in the Department of Biomedical Engineering. In a vapor mixture, it’s very difficult to tell chemicals apart,” he said.
A University of Michigan release reports that the main advance of the sensor under development by Fan and his colleagues at U-M and the University of Missouri, Columbia, is a better approach to divvying up the chemicals. The researchers have demonstrated their concept on a table-top set-up, and they hope to produce a hand-held device in the future.
Different chemical vapors can be thought of as tiny clouds, all overlapping in the original gas. In most gas sensors today, researchers separate the chemicals into smaller clouds by sending the gas through two tubes in sequence. A polymer coating on the inside of the first tube slows down heavier molecules, roughly separating the chemicals according to weight. The time it takes to get through the tube is the first clue to a chemical’s identity, Fan explained.
A pump and compressor collect gas from the first tube and then send it into the second tube at regular intervals. The second tube is typically coated with polar polymers, which are positively charged at one end and negatively charged at the other. This coating slows down polar gas molecules, allowing the non-polar molecules to pass through more quickly. With this second clue, the researchers can identify the chemicals in the gas.
The decision-maker added by Fan’s group consists of a detector and computer that watch for the beginnings and ends of partially separated chemical clouds. Under its direction, the compressor only runs when there is a complete cloud to send through. In addition to consuming one-tenth to one-hundredth of the energy expended by the compressor in typical systems, this approach makes data analysis easier by keeping all molecules of one type together, said Jing Liu, a graduate student in Fan’s group.
“It can save a lot of power, so our system can be used in remote areas,” she said.
The release notes that because no gas can enter the second tube until the previous chunk has gone all the way through, the smart system takes up to twice as long to fully analyze the gas. Adding alternative tubes for the second leg of the journey, however, can get the system up to speed. Then, the decision-maker acts like a telephone operator.
“It can tell if one tube is ‘busy’ and send the gas to another line,” Fan said.
This way, the device never stops the flow of the gas from the first tube. These second tubes can be customized for separating specific gasses, made to various lengths and with different coatings. As an example, Fan suggested that a dedicated tube for sensing specific molecules could serve as a “hotline.”
“If we have suspicion that there are chemical weapon vapors, then we send that particular batch of molecules to this hotline,” said Fan. “It could identify them with really high sensitivity.”
Fan’s team will study these sophisticated setups in the future. For now, they have proven that their decision-maker can distribute gas between two secondary tubes. Their smart sensors fully identified gasses containing up to 20 different chemicals, as well as compounds emitted by plants.
The work was supported by the National Science Foundation and the Center for Wireless Integrated Microsensing and Systems at the University of Michigan.

http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/

Indian University Prepares Anthrax-Fighting Vaccine, Antibodies

Biological technology specialists at Jawaharlal Nehru University in India are at work on a vaccine and antibodies to prevent or overcome infection by anthrax bacteria, the Times of India reported on Wednesday (see GSN, Feb. 3).
Antibodies developed at the institution's Biotechnology School have been shown to function as intended in animal trials; work on producing infection-fighting proteins for humans would be next.
"Anthrax outbreaks happen mostly in forest areas where they spread from animals that had contracted the infection. The antibodies will help in dealing with such cases, too. It may take us five more years to have the antibodies cleared by all the regulatory checks," according to professor Rakesh Bhatnagar, who is heading the antibody and vaccine efforts.
Human safety trials are under way for the anthrax vaccine. It could be made available for production and use after the end of the testing program.
"India, U.S., France and U.K. are all in a race to develop [a new] anthrax vaccine," Bhatnagar said. "Who will have it first will only depend on when they manage to complete all three human trials. One of the important reasons for developing the vaccine is its biothreat. In 2001 we saw how anthrax can be used by enemies to kill people. Inhaling the bacteria will lead to death in 99 percent of cases".

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Android app for radioactivity detection

Just-release Android app uses software and the smartphone’s camera to measure radioactivity levels, allowing users to find out whether their environments are safe; the software is the civilian version of technology developed under contracts with the U.S. Department of Defense and with DHS

Tawkon-developed radiation detection app for Android // Source: portfolio.com

East Hartford, Connecticut-based Image Insight Inc. announced the release of their first commercial product, the GammaPix app for Android phones. The app uses software and the smartphone’s camera to measure radioactivity levels, allowing users to find out whether their environments are safe. The software is the civilian version of technology developed under contracts with the U.S. Department of Defense and with DHS.
GammaPix can be used for detection of radioactivity in everyday life: exposure on airplanes, medical procedures, or contaminated products. The system also detects hazards from less common events such as accidents at nuclear power plants, a terrorist attack by a dirty bomb, or quietly placed radioactive silent sources.
Initially the product will be available as a free trial download on specific Android phones. The company says that an iPhone version will follow shortly, as will professional apps on both platforms for police, fire, medical, and other first responders. These products are currently in beta-testing in the United States and Japan and by the U.S. and U.K. militaries. The company notes that the accuracy of the measurements has been verified for specific phone models at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
The patented GammaPix technology is based on software that analyzes images produced by a surveillance camera, Webcam, or smartphone to measure gamma radiation exposure at the device. The technology is said to be sensitive enough to detect, within seconds, dangerously high levels of radiation so action can be taken immediately. GammaPix can also be used to collect data over longer periods, from minutes (to detect weaker radioactivity sources), to hours — measuring normal background radioactivity.
Image Insight, which now owns all of GammaPix intellectual property, is the third spin-off from Advanced Fuel Research, Inc. (AFR), where the development of the technology began. AFR has had two previous successful spin-off companies: On-line Technologies, Inc. and Real Time Analyzers, Inc.

 http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/

Universities Working on Improved Chemical Sensor

Researchers at the University of Michigan and the University of Missouri are working on an improved, transportable device for detection of chemical warfare materials or other dangerous gases, according to a press release issued on Tuesday (see GSN, Feb. 14, 2011).
The technology is more effective at separating airborne materials for testing and requires lower levels of energy than existing models, the University of Michigan said.
"In a vapor mixture, it's very difficult to tell chemicals apart," University of Michigan biomedical engineering specialist Xudong Fan said in the release.
The device also "can save a lot of power, so our system can be used in remote areas," added one of Fan's graduate students, Jing Liu.
The specialists have produced a system that can be placed on a table and continued work is intended to lead to development of a device that could be held in the human hand (University of Michigan release, May 1).

http://www.nti.org/gsn/

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Conference Planners to Meet Next Week

The planning panel for the 2015 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review conference is scheduled to convene its inaugural meeting on Monday, the United Nations has announced (see GSN, March 6).
The meeting, slated to continue through May 11, would be followed by two additional preliminary gatherings in advance of the 2015 conference. Planners are expected to consider "substantive and procedural issues" relevant to the nonproliferation treaty as well as the upcoming summit, according to a U.N. statement.
Review conferences are held every five years, allowing member nations to assess the operations of the treaty and to propose actions for strengthening the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.
The planning body is intended to lay the groundwork for the 2015 meeting by evaluating execution of the treaty's various measures, and to help enable coordination among governments on possibly delivering proposals for the upcoming conference.
Australian Ambassador to the United Nations Peter Woolcott is set to serve as chairman of the initial gathering (United Nations release, April 25).

 http://www.nti.org/gsn/

South Asian Nuclear War Would Upend World Food Supply: Analysis

A nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan would produce airborne debris that would poison distant crop fields with radioactive material and curb worldwide precipitation and heat levels, disrupting global agriculture and potentially causing the starvation of more than 1 billion people, according to an independent analysis issued on Tuesday (see GSN, Feb. 24, 2011).
The expert behind the assessment said he marshaled empirical evidence in support of admonitions that a nuclear conflict might have unplanned international repercussions, Agence France-Presse reported.
"It is not just the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia that pose a threat to the whole world," Ira Helfand, a Massachusetts doctor with the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, said in an interview with AFP. "Even these smaller [arsenals] pose an existential threat to our civilization, if not to our species. It would certainly end modern society as we know it."
Climatic alterations resulting from a nuclear conflict would cut the U.S. corn yield by a mean level of one-tenth for 10 years, according to the analysis. Soybean growth would suffer a comparable decrease, falling most significantly in the initial five years following the exchange, it adds.
Chinese rice generation would take a mean-level hit of 21 percent in the 48 months following such an event and endure a 10 percent decline for six subsequent years, Helfand determined.
The calculations do not consider boosts in ultraviolet radiation or the possibility of new weather cycles resulting in the rapid, deadly freezing of commercial vegetation, meaning agricultural tolls of a nuclear conflict might exceed Helfand's projections, AFP reported.
The analyst said more profound weather shifts would result if either Washington or Moscow employed a relatively limited part of its nuclear stockpile in an offensive.
"The U.S. and Russia are not likely to start a war with each other, but we know of at least five times when the U.S. or Russia prepared to launch a nuclear attack because it believed it was under attack," he said.
"Luck" alone would be responsible for the continued absence of a major nuclear war until the former Cold War rivals eliminate most of their nuclear armaments and eliminate the capacity to fire remaining bombs on extremely short notice, he said.

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